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SOME PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY UNINCORPORATED
ASSOCIATIONS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE*
By NOLEN L. BRUNSON**
I. Introduction
This article is addressed to certain problems in civil procedure pre-
sented by unincorporated associations. The specific problems con-
sidered are: (1) proper parties plaintiff or defendant, (2) jurisdic-
tion over the association from the standpoint of conflict of laws, (3)
the proper place of trial, venue, (4) proper service of process, and (5)
execution of a judgment against the association. Each of these
problems is treated as the section headings hereinafter will indicate.
In each section the chronological order is, first, the common law rule,
second, the equity rule, third, the effect of the fusion of law and
equity, and finally, the effect of modern statutes and the cases inter-
preting these statutes. For reasons of convenience, only in personam
actions are considered.
No special treatment is given to any particular type of associa-
tion except the labor union, and then only in the section on parties
to actions. Decisions in this field seem to preview decisions in other
fields. For the most part, all types of associations are considered,
and in the absence of special legislation, all associations will fall
into the general rules outlined. A common example of such special
legislation is the fraternal benefit association.1 However, these have
not been treated separately because the statutes generally require
certain acts to be done before any business can be transacted. The
same is generally true of joint stock companies, business trusts,
2
and exchanges.3 This article is limited to the types of associations
which are not required to comply with such requirements. Some
common examples are labor unions, churches, and lodges.
This is not a philosophical discussion of the nature of the asso-
OThis paper was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of
Master of Laws, Tulane University School of Law, 1953-1954.00 B.A., Furman University, 1950; LL.B., Tulane University School of Law. 1953. Mem-
ber of the South Carolina Bar.
1. As for suability of fraternal benefit associations issuing policies of insur-
ance, see Anno. 88 A.L.R. 164.
2. For special treatment of the suability of the Massachusetts Trust, see
Anno. 31 A.L.R. 851, 46 A.L.R. 158, 58 A.L.R. 526, 71 A.L.R. 898.
3. For special treatment on actions by or against exchanges, see Anno. 94
A.L.R. 851, 141 A.L.R. 789.
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ciation; neither is it a discussion of the rights of the members of
the association between themselves, nor even of the substantive laws
relating to liability of members for acts of the association. Assum-
ing that all of the members are liable in the sense that the obligation
incurred was an associational obligation, the questions explored re-
late to the methods which can be used to enforce these substantive
rights.
In the federal courts if the suit is to enforce a substantive federal
right, which presumably means a federal question, Rule 17 (b) (1)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives the association the
capacity to sue or to be sued in the common name. If, however,
the suit is not on a federal question, Rule 17 (b), supra, lays down
the principle that state law governs. Therefore, discussion of these
problems in the federal courts is omitted.
II. Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions
It was very early settled at common law that an unincorporated
association could not sue nor be sued in its common name.4 The
reason usually given was that it is not a separate and distinct entity
apart from its members. This rule obtained too, in suits in equity.5
In cases where the plaintiffs or defendants were members of an un-
incorporated association, the only remedy at law was to join all
members as plaintiffs or defendants. The members were regarded
as joint obligors or obligees.
However, in a suit in equity, although there could be no suit in
the common name, the rule was also early developed that when the
persons interested in a suit are numerous, or the attempt to unite
them in one suit would be impracticable, or exceedingly inconveni-
ent, the court would allow a bill to be brought by or against some
of the group on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
taking care that there should be due representation of all substantial
interests. 6 This became known as the class suit, and was justified
by the doctrine of virtual representation. As said by Story:
The second class of cases, constituting an exception to the
4. Grossman v. Granville Club, 28 S.J. 513 (1884) ; Bloom v. National Federa-
tion, 35 T.L.R. 50 (1918) ; London Association for the Protection of Trade v.
Greenlands, A.C. 15 (1916); In re Pruitt, 113 L.T. 136 (1915). See Lloyd,
Actions Instituted by or Against Unincorporated Bodies, 12 MoD. L. Rrv. 408
(1949); 9 CAN. B. Rv. 223 (1931).
5. Maguire v. Reough, 238 Mass. 98, 130 N.E. 270 (1920) ; Canfield v. Bes-
inger, 5 Sch. Reg. 17 (Penn. Comm. Pl. 1937).
6. Lloyd v. Loaring, 6 Ves. 773, 31 Eng. Rep. 1302 (1802); Fells v. Read,
3 Ves. 70, 30 Eng. Rep. 899 (1800).
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general rule, and already alluded to, is, where the parties form
a voluntary association for public or private purposes, and those
who sue or defend may fairly be presumed to represent the
rights and interests of the whole.
7
In this country, there has been an almost universal acceptance of
these rules. In actions at law an unincorporated association cannot
sue or be sued in its association or common name.8 The reason has
7. STORY, EQUITY PLEADING § 107 (7th ed. 1865).
8. The following authorities expressly so hold, or recognize the existence
of the rule:
Alabama: Ex parte Hill, 165 Ala. 365, 51 So. 787 (1910); Grand Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Green, 206 Ala. 196, 89 So.
435 (1921).
Arkansas: Lewelling v. Manufacturers Wood-Workers Underwriters, 140
Ark. 124, 215 S.W. 259 (1919) ; Baskin v. United Mine Workers of America,
150 Ark. 398, 234 S.W. 464 (1921).
California: Herald v. Glendale Lodge, 46 Cal. App. 325, 189 Pac. 329 (1920).
Florida: Richardson v. C. W. Smith & Co., 21 Fla. 336 (1885); Johnson v.
Albritton, Cir. Judge, 101 Fla. 1285, 134 So. 563 (1931).
Georgia: Barbour v. Albany Lodge, 73 Ga. 474 (1884); Caine v. Armenia
Lodge, 12 Ga. App. 251, 77 S.E. 184 (1913); O'Jay Spread Co. v. Hick,
185 Ga. 507, 195 S.E. 564 (1938); Smith v. International Ladies Garment
Workers Union, 58 Ga. App. 26, 197 S.E. 349 (1938).
Illinois: Cahill v. Plumbers Gas & Steam Fitters Local, 238 Ill. App. 123,
(1925) ; O'Connell v. Lamb, 63 Ill. App. 652 (1895).
Indiana: Hughes v. Walker, Carter & Co., 4 Blackf. 50 (Ind. 1935) ; Pollock
v. Dunning, 54 Ind. 115 (1876) ; Mackenzie v. School Trustees, 72 Ind. 189
(1880); Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers' Union, 165
Ind. 421, 75 N.E. 877, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 788 (1905) ; Farmers Mutual v. Reser,
43 Ind. App. 738, 88 N.E. 349 (1909) ; Colt v. Hicks, 97 Ind. App. 177, 179
N.E. 335 (1932).
Iowa: Nightingale v. Barney, 4 G. Greenl. 106 (Iowa 1853); McConnell v.
Gardner, Morris 272 (Iowa 1844) ; Westbrook v. Griffin, 132 Iowa 185, 109
N.W. 608 (1906); Marshall-Town Mutual Plate Glass Ass'n v. Bendlage,
195 Iowa 1200, 193 N.W. 448 (1922) ; Hadley v. Elm Grove Mutual Telephone
Co., 150 Iowa 198, 129 N.W. 807 (1901); Presbyterian Church of Paralta,
Lynn County v. Johnson, 213 Iowa 48, 238 N.W. 456 (1931) ; Wilson v. Air-
line Coal Co., 215 Iowa 855, 246 N.W. 753 (1933) ; Lamm v. Stoen, 226 Iowa
662, 284 N.W. 465, 121 A.L.R. 627 (1939) ; United Packing House Workers
of America v. Boynton, 240 Iowa 212, 35 N.W. 2d 881 (1949).
Louisiana: RrvISED CIVIL COD4 OF 1870, Art. 446; Soller v. Mouton, 3 La.
Ann. 541 (1848).
Maine: McGreary v. Chandler, 58 Me. 537 (1870).
Maryland: Mears v. Moulton, 30 Md. 142 (1868).
Massachusetts: Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753 (1906) ; New
England States Sangelbund v. Fidelia Musicians & Educational Society, 218
Mass. 174, 105 N.E. 629 (1914) ; Denovan v. Danielson, 244 Mass. 432, 138
N.E. 811 (1923); Tyler v. Boot & Shoe Workers, 285 Mass. 54, 188 N.E.
509 (1933) ; Malloy v. Carrol, 287 Mass. 376, 191 N.E. 661 (1934).
Michigan: Detroit Schuetzenbund v. Detroit Agitation Verein, 44 Mich. 313,
6 N.W. 675 (1880); Jenkinson v. Wysner, 125 Mich. 89, 83 N.W. 1012
(1900).
Minnesota: St. Paul's Typothetae v. St. Paul's Bookbinders Union, 94 Minn.
351, 102 N.W. 725 (1905).
Mississippi: Vardo v. Whitney, 166 Miss. 663, 147 So. 479 (1933).
Missouri: Newton Count. Farmers & Fruit Growers Exchange v. Kansas
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been variously attributed to the rule that there is no entity separate
and distinct from the members, 9 or that there is a lack of certainty
of the parties,O or that the parties have been misnamed," or that
City Southern Ry. Co., 326 Mo. 617, 31 S.W. 2d 803 (1930) ; Road District
No. 30 v. Jackson, 208 Mo. App. 194, 231 S.W. 1043 (1921) ; Ruggles v. I.A.
B.S. & D. I. 0., 331 Mo. 20, 52 S.W. 2d 860 (1932) ; Corbett v. Milk Wagon
Drivers Union, 84 S.W. 2d 377 (Mo. App. 1935); Forrest City Mg. Co. v.
International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 233 Mo. App. 935, II S.W.
2d 934 (1938); O'Rouke v. Kelly the Printer, 233 Mo. App. 91, 135 S.W.
1011 (1911); Bentley v. Hurlyey, 222 Mo. App. 51, 299 S.W. 604 (1927).
Montana: Vance v. McGinley, 39 Mont. 46, 101 Pac. 247 (1909).
Nevada: The Proprietors of Mexican Mill v. The Yellow Jacket Mining
Co., 4 Nev. 40, (1868); Branson v. Industrial Workers, 30 Nev. 270, 95
Pac. 354 (1908).
New Hampshire: Danbury Cornet Band v. Bean, 54 N.H. 524 (1874).
New Jersey: Kline v. Knights of the Golden Eagle, 113 N.J. Eq. 513, 167
Atl. 758 (1933).
New York: Hanke v. Cigar Makers International Union, 27 Misc. 529, 58
N.Y.S. 412 (1899).
North Carolina: Tucker v. Eatough, 186 N.C. 515, 120 S.E. 57 (1923); Mar-
shall v. Lovelace, Cam. & N. 217 (N.C. 1801).
Ohio: State v. Board of Underwriters, 40 Bull 245 (Ohio 1898) ; Congrega-
tion of St. Augustine Roman Catholic Church v. Metropolitan Bank, 15
Ohio 520, 32 N.E. 2d 518 (1936).
Oregon: Kimball v. Lower Columbia Fire Relief Ass'n of Oregon, 67 Or.
249, 135 Pac. 877 (1913).
Pennsylvania: Manich v. Order of Americus, 223 Pa. 199, 72 At. 528 (1909);
Wolf v. Limestone Council, 233 Pa. 357, 82 Atl. 499 (1912); Oster v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 271 Pa. 419, 114 Atl.
377 (1921).
Rhode Island: Guild v. Allen, 29 R.I. 430, 67 Atl. 855 (1907).
Tennessee: Powers v. Journeymen Bricklayers Union, 130 Tenn. 643, 172
S.W. 284 (1914).
Texas: Methodist Episcopal Church South v. Clifton, 34 Tex. Civ. App.
248, 78 S.W. 732 (1904); Gribble v. Call, 123 S.W. 2d 711 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1938).
Utah: Pearson v. Anderburg, 28 Utah 495, 80 Pac. 307 (1905).
Vermont: F. R. Patch Mfg. Co. v. Capeless, 79 Vt. 1, 63 Atl. 938 (1903).
Virginia: International Brotherhood v. Wood, 162 Va. 517, 175 S.E. 45 (1934).
Washington: St. Germain v. Bakery & Confectionry Union, 97 Wash. 282, 166
Pac. 664 (1917).
West Virginia: Simpson v. Grand Brotherhood, 83 W.Va. 355, 98 S.E. 580
(1919); West v. B. & 0. Ry., 103 W.Va. 417, 137 S.E. 654 (1927); Milan
v. Settle, 127 W.Va. 271, 32 S.E. 2d 269 (1944) ; State ex rel West Virginia
State Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Charleston, 133 W.Va. 403,
56 S.E. 2d 763 (1949).
Wisconsin: Crawley v. American Society of Equity, 153 Wis. 13, 139 N.W.
734 (1913).
See also the following authorities: Sturgis, Unincorporated Associations as
Parties to Actions, 33 YALE L. J. 383 (1924) ; WRIGHTINGTON, UNIycoRPoR-
ATUD ASSOClATIONS AND BUSINgSS TRUSTS 425-444 (2d Ed. 1923); Anno.
27 A.L.R. 786, supplemented in 149 A.L.R. 510.
9. Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753 (1906) ; Lister v. Vowell,
122 Ala. 264, 25 So. 564 (1898) ; Lewelling v. Woodworkers Union, 140 Ark.
124, 215 S.W. 258 (1919); Baskin v. United Mine Workers, 150 Ark. 124,
215 S.W. 258 (1921).
10. Reid & Co. v. McLeod, 20 Ala. 576 (1852); Blackwell v. Reid & Co.,
41 Miss. 102 (1866); Holland v. Butler, 5 Blackf. 255 (Ind. 1839); Cady v.
Smith, 12 Neb. 628, 12 N.W. 95 (1882).
11. Porter v. Cresson, 10 Serg. & R. 257 (Pa. 1823).
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interested parties have not been joined, 12 or that the Christian and
ancestral names are not on the record,'8 or some writers have an-
nounced a more basic reason.14 But, whatever the reason, it is
well settled that in the absence of a statute, all members of an unin-
corporated association must be joined as plaintiffs or as defendants
in an action at law.15 In equity procedure, as stated above, the
class suit has likewise won practically universal acceptance.
16
Nevertheless, in some cases it has been held that the defect was
not seasonably raised, and was therefore waived.' 7 In other cases,
12. Burden v. Cross, 33 Tex. 685 (1870); Hays v. Lanier, 3 Blackf. 322
(Ind. 1833).
13. Livingston v. Harvey, 10 Ind. 218 (1858); Day v. Cushman, Eatmon &
Co., 2 Ill. 475 (1838).
14. Sturgis, Unincorporated Associations As Parties To Actions, 33 YALE
L. J. 383, 414 (1924) ; 37 ItLL. L. REv. 70 (1943) ; Dodd, Dogma And Practice
Of Associations, 42 HARV. L. REv. 977 (1929).
15. Baskin v. United Mine Workers, 150 Ark. 398, 234 S.W. 464 (1921);
DeQueen v. Park, 146 Ark. 350, 225 S.W. 614 (1920); Soller v. Mouton, 3
La. Ann. 541 (1848) ; Simpson v. Grand International Brotherhood, 83 W.Va.
355, 98 S.E. 580 (1919) ; O'Connell v. Lamb, 63 IIl. App. 652, (1900) ; Sturgis,
Unincorporated Associations As Parties To Actions, 33 YALE L. J. 383 (1924) ;
WRIGHTINGTON, UNINCORPORATED AsSOCIATIONS AND BusINEss TRUSTS 426
(2d Ed. 1923).
16. United Brotherhood of Maintenance, etc. v. Kennedy, 13 Del. Ch. 106,
115 At. 587 (1922); O'Connell v. Lamb, 63 Ill. App. 652 (1895); Cahill v.
Plumbers Gas & Steam Fitters Union, 238 IIl. App. 123 (1925); Biller v.
Eagan, 290 Ill. App. 219, 8 N.E. 2d 205 (1937); WAestern-United Dairy Co.
v. Nash, 293 II. App. 219, 12 N.E. 2d 47 (1937); Carpenters' Union v. Citi-
zen's Committee, 333 Ill. App. 225, 164 N.E. 393 (1928); Republican Central
Committee v. Cook County, 348 Ill. App. 189, 108 N.E. 2d 524 (1952) ; Guil-
ford v. Author, 158 Ill. 600, 41 N.E. 1009 (1895) ; Tate v. Ohio Co., 10 Ind.
174 (1858); Sourse v. Marshall, 23 Ind. 194 (1864); Zuelly v. Casper, 160
Ind. 460, 67 N.E. 103 (1903); Fink v. Umsheid, 40 Kan. 271, 19 Pac. 623
(1888); Birmingham v. Gallagher, 112 Mass. 179 (1873); Snow v. Wheeler,
113 Mass. 179 (1873) ; Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753 (1906) ;
New England Sanglebund v. Fidelia Musicians & Educational Society, 218 Mass.
174, 105 N.E. 629 (1914); Donovan v. Danielson, 244 Mass. 432, 138 N.E.
811 (1923) ; Rowzee v. Pierce, 75 Miss. 807, 23 So. 307 (1898) ; State ex rel
Allai v. Thatch, 361 Mo. 190, 234 S.W. 2d 1 (1950); Egan v. Bonacum, 38
Neb. 577, 57 N.W. 298 (1894); Branson v. Industrial Workers of the World,
30 Nev. 270, 95 Pac. 354 (1908); Van Houten v. Pine, 36 N.J. Eq. 133 (1882) ;
Anglo-Continentale Tr. M. v. Algemeine, 171 Misc. 714, 13 N.Y.S. 2d 397
(1939) ; Liggett v. Ladd, 17 Or. 89, 21 Pac. 133 (1888) ; Liederkrafiz Singing
Society v. Germania Turn-Verein, 163 Pa. St. 265, 29 Atl. 918 (1894) ; Elliot
v. Greer Presbyterian Church, 181 S.C. 84, 186 S.E. 651 (1936); Barns v.
Fort, 181 Tenn. 522, 181 S.W. 2d 881 (1944); Pearson v. Anderburg, 28
Utah 495, 80 Pac. 307 (1905); St. Germain Bakery v. Bakery & Confectionry
Union, 97 Wash. 282, 166 Pac. 665 (1917); Simpson v. Grand Brotherhood, 83
W.Va. 355, 98 S.E. 580 (1919); Milan v. Settle, 127 W.Va. 271, 32 S.E. 2d
269 (1944).
17. Ada Street Methodist Episcopal Church v. Garney, 66 Ill. 132 (1872);
Franklin Union No. 4 v. People, 220 Ill. 355, 77 N.E. 176 (1906); Barnes
v. Chicago Typographical Union, 232 Ill. 402, 83 N.E. 932 (1908); United
Packing House v. Boynton, 240 Iowa 212, 35 N.W. 2d 881 (1949); Dorsey
v. Lawrence & Co., Hardin 517 (Ky. 1808); United Mine Workers v. Dorsey,
159 Ky. 605, 167 S.W. 891 (1914) ; McGreary v. Chandler, 58 Me. 537 (1870) ;
[Vol. 7
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it has been held that the defect is not waivable, and a judgment
rendered against the association is void.1 8 Other courts have found
enough elements of estoppel to justify a disregard of the defect of
parties and to enter a judgment as if the association were incorpo-
rated.' 9 The estoppel is generally a holding out to the general public
that the association is a corporation, or possessed of corporate powers.
Thus, in a subsequent suit, the court will not allow the association
to set up the lack of corporate existence.
On the other hand, in suits in equity, the practice has been to
continue the previous procedure of allowing suits by a member or
members for the benefit of all, even in the absence of statutes so
providing.
2 0
In some states statutes have been enacted changing these rules in
various ways. The first one to be considered logically, and the first
to appear chronologically, is the statutory class action. The form
of the statute has generally assumed two distinct types, though a
difference of substance is doubtful. The first one, and by far the
more popular, is almost a verbatim statement of the equity rule, and
is as follows :21
When the question is one of a common or general interest to
many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is im-
practicable to bring them all before the court, one or more may
sue or defend for the benefit of all.
Many states have adopted this type of statute, and usually in the
same language.
22
Alco Finance Co. v. Moran, 178 Okla. 575, 63 P. 2d 747 (1937). See also
Sturgis, Unincorporated Associations As Parties To Actions, 33 YALE L. 3.
383, 389, note 30 (1924).
18. Methodist Church v. Clifton, 34 Te-x. Civ. App. 248, 78 S.W. 732 (1900);
WRIGHTINGTON, UNNcORPoRATED ASSOCIATIONS AND BusimNss TRUSTS 425
(2nd Ed. 1924) ; Sturgis, Unincorporated Associations As Parties To Actions,
33 YALE L. J. 383 (1924). See Soper v. Clay City Lumber Co., 21 Ky. L.
Rep. 1236, 53 SA.. 267 (1899).
19. 7 MINN. L. REV. 42, 44 (1922).
20. See note 16 supra.
21. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-205.
22. CODE OF ALABAMA, 1940, § 7-128; ARKANSAS STATUTES OF 1947, § 27-
809; CALIVORNIA CODE or CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 383; COLORADO CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, 1921, § 12; GENERAL STATUTES OF CONNEcTICUT, 1949, § 7827;
FLORIDA STATUTES ANNOTATED, § 63.14, now Equity Rule 14; GEORGIA CODE,
1933, § 37-1002; GENERAL STATUTES OF KANSAS, 1949, § 60-413; KENTUCKY
Civn. CODE or PRACTICE, § 25; MINNESOTA STATUTES ANNOTATED, § 540.02;
REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 93-2821; REVIsD STATUTES or NEBRASKA,
1943, § 25-319; NEVADA COMPILED LAWS (Hillyer 1929) § 8558; NEW MrzxIco
STATUTES OF 1941, § 19-601; NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ACT, § 195; NORTH
CAROLINA GENERAL STATUTES, § 1-70; NORTH DAKOTA REVISED CODE OF 1943,
§ 28-0208; PAGE'S OHIO GENERAL COD ANNOTATED, 1938, § 11257; OKLA-
1955]
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The other form of statute is embodied in Rule 23 (a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, in which no substantial change was made
from the first type quoted above, even though it states with greater
particularity instances in which class suits may be maintained-
differences not relevant here. The federal rule has also been adopted
in some states.2 3
It is readily seen that this statutory class suit would be available
in an action against an unincorporated association if the type of
relief demanded were an equitable one; that is, an injunction, specific
performance or reformation of an instrument, because those were
traditionally equitable remedies, and the class suit was traditionally
allowed in equity. However, with the adoption of a statutory class
action, and the attempt to fuse law and equity, both substantively and
procedurally, the question has arisen whether the statutory class ac-
tion applies to an action at law. The problem is, do these statutes
apply only to a suit in equity or of traditionally equitable nature,
or may they apply in an action at law?
As could well be expected, the courts which have passed on this
question have reached varying results. Some courts have held that
the statutory class suit does apply to an action at law,24 some have
hinted that it does not,2 5 and some have specifically reserved the
point.26 In some states, there is reason to believe that the court will
hold that the class action does not apply to actions at law, although
HOMA STATUTES ANNOTATED, 1937, § 12-233; OREGON CoMPILED LAWS ANNO-
TATED, 1940, § 9-106; PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF CIVIL PROcEDURE No. 2230;
SOUTH DAKOTA CODE, 1939, § 33.0410; REVISED CODE OF WASHINGTON, 1950,
§ 4.08,070; WISCONSIN STATUTES, 1951, § 260-12; WYOMING COMPILED STA-
TUTES, 1945, § 3-616.
23. ARIZONA CODE ANNOTATED, 1939, § 21-524; COLORADO RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, No. 23; DELAWARE CHANCERY COURT RULE No. 23; IOwA RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE No. 42; VERNON'S ANNOTATED MISSOURI STATUTES,
§ 507.070; NEw MEXIcO STATUTES OF 1941, § 19-101(23); VERNON'S TEXAS
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1948 Supp.), Rule 42; UTAH RULES OF CIVL
PROCEDURE No. 23 (a).
24. Platt v. Colvin, 50 Ohio St. 703, 36 N.E. 735 (1893); Branson v. In-
dustrial Vorkers of the World, 30 Nev. 270, 95 Pac. 354 (1908); Baker v.
Ducker, 79 Cal. 365, 372, 21 Pac. 764, 765 (1889); Florence v. Helms, 136
Cal. 613, 69 Pac. 429 (1902); Colt v. Hicks, 97 Ind. App. 177, 179 N.E. 335
(1932) ; Jackson v. International Union, 307 Ky. 485, 211 S.W. 2d 138 (1948) ;
Anglo-Continentale Tr. M. v. Algemeine, 171 Misc. 714, 13 N.Y.S. 2d 397
(1939); but see Cavanaugh v. Hutchenson, 140 Misc. 178, 250 N.Y.S. 127,
aff'd 236 App. Div. 794, 259 N.Y.S. 967 (1931); Blonde v. Stern, 73 N.D.
272, 14 N.W. 2d 249 (1944).
25. Cahill v. Plumbers Gas & Steam Fitters Union, supra, note 5; State
Provision Co. v. Oregon Ry. & Navigation Co., 20 Or. 563, 26 Pac. 838 (1891).
26. Baskin v. United Mine Workers, 150 Ark. 398, 234 S.W. 464 (1921).
[Vol. 7
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there is no present holding to that effect.2 7  Others seem to lead to
the opposite conclusion, either by implication, or by express word-
ing in the statute.
28
In those states which have held or which would probably hold
that the class suit does not apply to an action at law, there could
possibly be an argument made that there is no adequate remedy at
law when the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all before the court, and thus a suit could be brought in equity.
That is, the mere fact that the members are numerous would be
sufficient to render the remedy at law inadequate and allow a suit
in equity. However, one court has rejected this argument, presum-
ably on the theory that the inadequacy of the remedy at law must be
in the remedy given, i. e., a money judgment, rather than procedure
used in the trial of a law case.
29
The next type of statute is one in which an attempt was made to
deal with the problem on a higher level. The text of such a statute
is as follows :30
When two or more persons, associated in any business, transact
such business under a common name, . . . the associates may
be sued by such common name ....
Two things should be noted about this statute, which has been
adopted in some states.8 1 The first is that it only authorizes suits
against the association, not suits by it.32 If the association is suing,
27. See District No. 21, U.M.W. v. Bourland, 169 Ark. 796, 277 S.W. 546
(1925). See also, for example, CODE OF GEORGIA, 1933, § 37-1003, in the chap-
ter entitled "Parties To Equitable Proceedings". Also, see DELAWARE CHAN-
cERY RULE 23, whereas there is no analogous rule for the Superior Court. It
would seem that in states where there has not been even a codification of the
equitable principle, the practice must still be governed by older equitable princi-
ples, and such practice will not obtain in actions at law. Such states are Massa-
chusetts, Illinois, Maine, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Virginia, and West Virginia.
28. Grover v. Marcott, 192 Ind. 552, 136 N.E. 81 (1922). It would seem that
in those jurisdictions which have adopted the federal rules, class suits should
be allowed in an action at law. Such states are noted in note 20 supra. In
addition, those states which provide that there is but one civil action should
have sufficient manifestation of legislative intent to allow the procedure in
an action at law. Some statutes expressly provide that the rule of procedure
governs actions at law as well as suits in equity.
29. Maguire v. Reough, 238 Mass. 98, 130 N.E. 270 (1920).
30. CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 388.
31. REVISED CODE OF DELAWARE, 1935, § 4676; IDAHO CODE, § 5-323; RE-
VISED CODE OF MONTANA, 1947, § 93-2827; NEVADA COMPILED LAWS, (Hillyer
192) § 8564; OKLAHOMA STATUTES ANNOTATED, 1937, § 12-182; UTAH RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 17 (d) ; SOUTH DAKOTA CODE, 1939, § 33.08.
32. Holden v. Mensinger, 175 Cal. 300, 165 Pac. 950 (1917); Ginsberg Tile
Co. v. Farrone, 99 Cal. App. 381, 278 Pac. 866 (1929); Case v. Kadota Fig
Ass'n of Producers, 207 P. 2d 86 (Cal. App. 1949): modified 35 Cal. App.
2d 256, 220 P. 2d 912 (1950) ; The Proprietors of the Mexican Mill v. The
Yellow Jacket Mining Co., 4 Nev. 40 (1868).
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it must join all members or use a class suit.3 3 The second thing to
be noticed is that it requires that there be a transaction of business.
The term "transact business" has at least two possible meanings,
only one of which is relevant here. It could mean the standard by
which the courts determine the "presence" of a corporation or other
entity for the purpose of jurisdiction. This concept is very wide,
and includes many more things than commercial transactions. There
is another use of the term in which it is restricted to commercial
business, such as a trade or business in that sense. The problem is,
which meaning is intended here?
The courts which have passed upon this question have varied
from state to state and even reflect different trends in the same state.
First, there is the interpretation in which the ordinary and approved
usage of the word indicates, a regular, continuous and permanent
employment or enterprise for the main and governing purpose of
profit.3 4 But there are also cases which adhere to the more liberal
view, that the term is intended to embrace everything about which
anyone can be employed; it is not intended necessarily to imply a
profit motive, but is intended to cover any purpose, or any act to
carry out that purpose. 35 Thus counsel may argue in each case the
interpretation which he thinks the court should adopt.
Another statute which, though not worded the same way, seems
to require the same two elements is in force in Louisiana. 6 By the
wording of the statute, the association may be sued in the common
name upon any obligation which was entered into on behalf of its
members. Some statutes have been passed which attempt to rectify
the defect in this statute which prevents the association from suing
in the common name, but they seem unsatisfactory.3 7 The phrase
"for the benefit of the members" has received a restrictive interpre-
tation in one case in which the court held that this statute could not
be used by a member in mandamus proceedings to compel reinstate-
ment, because it was not on an obligation "incurred for the benefit
33. Von Schmidt v. Huntington, 1 Cal. 55 (1850); Jellen v. O'Brien, 89
Cal. App. 505, 264 Pac. 1115 (1928).
34. Swift v. San Francisco Stock & Exch. Bd., 67 Cal. 567, 8 Pac. 94 (1885);
Warman Steel Casting Company v. Redondo Beach Chamber of Commerce,
34 Cal. App. 37, 166 Pac. 856 (1917) ; St. Paul's Typothetae v. St. Paul Book-
binders Union No. 37, 94 Minn. 351, 102 N.W. 725, 3 Ann. Cas. 695 (1905).
35. Camm v. Justice's Court, 35 Cal. App. 293, 170 Pac. 409 (1917); Herald
v. Glendale Lodge, 46 Cal. App. 325, 189 Pac. 329 (1920) ; Jardine v. Superior
Court, 82 Cal. Dec. 188, 2 P. 2d 756 (1931). See 5 So. CAL. L. Rrv. 421
(1932).
36. LOUISIANA R vism STATUTES OF 1950, § 13:3471 (22).
37. LOUISIANA REviSED STATUTES OP 1950, § 9:3051. See McMahon, Parties
Litigant In Louisiana, 10 TULAzm L. REV. 489, 505, (1936). See also 3
Loy. L. Rnv. 80 (1946).
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of the members." 8 8 This interpretation seems to restrict the phrase
to contract actions alone or at least, it is a stricter term than the
phrase "transacting business." In Louisiana the situation is not
aided in this particular by the lack of a common law or equity back-
ground, since resort cannot be had to the equitable class suit. Due
to the historical background of the state, legislation is theoretically
the only source of law,8 9 and there is no statutory class suit.40 There-
fore, some other means will have to be used, possibly an assignment, or
a similar arrangement. However, recourse could be had to the federal
courts if the requisite jurisdictional requirements could be met, and
the class suit would then be available. Nevertheless, there seems to
be hope that the situation will soon be rectified.
41
There are several statutes in force in other states, which, though
retaining the requirement of a transaction of business, are somewhat
broader than the preceding statutes because they allow suits both
by and against the association in the common name. Such a statute
43
is as follows:
Any unincorporated association, consisting of 7 or more mem-
bers having a recognized name, may sue or be sued in any court
of this state ....
This chapter, in so far as it relates to actions of an equitable
nature against unincorporated organizations or associations, shall
38. State ex rel Doane v. General Longshore Workers, etc., 61 So. 2d 747
(La. App. 1952).
39. LOUISIANA RZvISxD CIVIL CODE OF 1870, Art. 1.
40. In a recent case, Levy v. Bonfouca Hunting Club . ....... La ......... , 67 So.
2d 96 (1953), the court admitted that there was no statutory authority for
the appointment of a receiver for a voluntary association. But, the court went
on to say that there was no law prohibiting it either, and that being so, the
court could "in the exercise of their inherent equitable power (emphasis added,
somewhat amazing language in view of the historical background of the Lou-
isiana court), make such appointment where the exigencies of the case require
it." Why could not the court "in the exercise of its inherent equitable power",
allow a class suit (a traditionally equitable principle), if the "exigencies of
the case" require it? In the cited case, the "exigencies" consisted of the
fact that the members of the association were very numerous, and it was
impossible, rather than impracticable, to bring them all before the court,
their whereabouts being unknown. It seems therefore, that if the court wanted
to import the class suit from English Equity principles, it could do so. See
also Executive Committee of French Opera Trade Ball v. Tarrant, 164 La. 83,
113 So. 174, 53 A.L.R. 1233 (1927).
41. At the present time, the Louisiana State Law Institute is preparing a
comprehensive revision of the LOUISIANA COD4 OF PRAcriC. At the present
time, there are no proposed texts available, but proposed texts dealing with
service of process and venue, which are available, deal specifically with unin-
corporated associations, thus raising the presumption that when the texts on
"Parties To Actions" becomes available, the unincorporated association will be
remembered.
42. Blank.
43. Nzv J asz" STATUTES ANNOTATED, § 2A :64-1.
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not apply to a fraternal, charitable or other organization not or-
ganized for pecuniary profit.
Presumably what is meant in the last quoted paragraph is to nega-
tive the application of the first paragraph to non-commercial organiza-
tions as a general proposition." However, it seems possible that a
suit for a money judgment could be brought against a non-commer-
cial organization because the statute only excepts actions of an
equitable nature.
Another statute45 of the same type provides:
Any company or association of persons formed for the purpose
of (1) carrying on any trade or business, (2) holding any specie
of property, or (3) representing an employee in collective bar-
gaining with employers, and not incorporated, may sue and be
sued by such usual name ....
Of course, this statute could cover non-commercial associations if
they came under subdivisions (2) or (3), but under subdivision (1),
non-commercial associations would seem to be excluded by the use
of the term "carrying on any trade or business."
One final statute within this group provides that any unincor-
porated voluntary association which is formed in the state or con-
ducts or transacts business there, or which maintains an office or place
of business in the state, can sue or be sued in the common name if
composed of 5 or more members and known by some distinguishing
name.46 Apparently it could be argued that if the association were
formed in the state, there is no requirement for the transaction of
business. At any rate, it undoubtedly applies to commercial asso-
ciations, and possibly, not positively, to non-commercial ones.
A principle which runs through all of the preceding statutes is
that there must be a transaction of business. Whether this means
commercial business or whether it merely incorporates the term used
in conflict of laws has been considered. There are statutes, however,
which expressly limit their application to non-commercial associa-
tions, that is, a commercial unincorporated association could not come
within its provision, while a non-commercial one does. One such
statute47 provides:
44. NEW JERSEY STATUTES ANNOTATED, § 2A64.6. Newark International
Baseball Club, Inc. v. Theatrical Manager, Agents, etc., 125 N.J. Eq. 575, 7 A.
2d 170 (1939).
45. RtVISED STATUTES OF NEBRASKA, 1943, § 25-313.
46. COPrLILED LAWS OF MICHIGAN, 1948, § 612.12.
47. WYOMING COMPILED STATUTES, 1945, § 44-908.
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Any unincorporated body, society, association or organization
• ..not organized or formed for the purpose of carrying on,
conducting or operating any business or branch of business ...
may take, acquire, hold and lease and convey real, personal and
mixed property ....
If it becomes necessary at any time to protect the rights of
any body, society, organization or association as defined in the
last preceding section . . . the presiding officer thereof may
bring suit in its own name for the benefit of the body ....
Any such body, society, association or organization . . .may
sue and be sued in the name by which it is generally known ....
Some statutes allow suits to be brought by or against unincorpo-
rated associations if it is formed for the promotion of mutual pleasure
or recreation, or is a hunting, fishing, camping, golf or country club,
or "association for a similar purpose. ' 48 Such an association, if it
files the necessary papers, may sue and be sued in its name without
the individual members being joined.49 Although the statute pro-
vides expressly for "recreational activities," the phrase "or other
such association" would probably allow a wider interpretation. How-
ever, it is doubtful that a commercial association could come within
this statute.
Unincorporated societies or lodges of Elks, Knights of Columbus,
Knights of Pythias, Masons, Moose and Odd Fellows or other simi-
lar fraternal organizations may be deemed corporations so far as may
be necessary to take, hold, manage and use any gift or grant made to
them as such, in one state.5 0 Such a society may sue and be sued in re-
gard to such property in its corporate capacity, but, by implication,
only such suits would be allowed.
There exists in one state a statutory definition of a fraternal bene.
fit society. It is defined as a corporation, society, order or voluntary
association, without capital stock, organized and carried on solely
for the benefit of its members and their beneficiaries, and not for
profit, and having a lodge system with ritualistic form of meetings
and a representative form of government.5 1 Such a society may
sue and be sued as such, without the joinder of any member.52 The
chief difficulty here would seem to be the classification of a given
48. Nzw MEXICO STATUTES ANNOTATED, 1941, § 52-101.
49. NEW MEXICO STATUTE ANN OATED, 1941, § 51-105.
50. REVISED STATUTES or NEw HAMPSHIRE, 1942, c. 272, § 11.
51. WXST VIRGINIA CODE OF 1949, § 33-8-1.
52. WEST VIRGINIA CODE OF 1949, § 33-8-17.
1955]
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol7/iss3/4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
association as a "fraternal benefit society" within the statutory de-
finition.
Some states have statutes which attack the problem of the proper
parties in the field of unincorporated associations without prescrib-
ing a suit in the common name. The statute sets up the principle
of a forced statutory representative, that is, the association sues or
is sued in the name of a certain officer or member as trustee ad litem.58
One such statute provides that a member or officer may sue as trustee
ad litem for the association, but that in a suit against the association,
an officer only can be the trustee ad litem.54 Others provide for a
certain designated officer to sue and to be sued.55 Some of these
statutes contain the proviso that the action is allowed if the suit
could have been by or against all by virtue of their joint interest.56
This does not appear to be a real limitation, since if all members could
not sue or be sued for the obligation, the obligation would not
appear to be an association obligation.
The above statutes apply generally to all types of unincorporated
associations. However, in one state, the members of any grand lodge
or division, or of any subordinate lodge or division, of Free Masons,
Odd Fellows, Hermann's Sons, or Sons of Temperance, Grand Army
of the Republic, or of the State Grange, or order of Patrons of Hus-
bandry and other such groups, may elect not less than three nor more
than nine of their number as trustees to take care of the property
and transact all the business of the association. 57 Such trustees may
sue and be sued in matters pertaining to the association. 58 Of course,
such a set-up could probably be organized anywhere, since most
states except from the operation of the rule of the real party in interest,
trustees of express trusts. However, it is apparently the only me-
thod in this particular state outside the class suit.
Obviously, the most advanced and effective way to deal with the
problem of parties is to allow the association to sue or be sued in
the common name, regardless of its character as a commercial asso-
ciation. The statutes do not make a distinction between commercial
and non-commercial associations, but not all of them allow suits
both by and against the association. One such statute provides that
53. PENNSYLVANIA RULES Or CIVIL PROCEDURE, No. 2152; NEW YORK GEN-
ERA ASSOCIATIONS LAW, § 13, 14.
54. PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, No. 2125, 2153.
55. NEW YORK GENERAL ASSOCIATIONS LAW, § 13, 14.
56. NEW YORK GENERAL ASSOCIATIONS LAW, § 13; GENERAL LAWS OF RHODE
ISLAND, 1938, c. 530, § 1.
57. WiscoNsIn STATUTES, 1951, § 188.02.
58. See note 57 supra.
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an unincorporated association may be sued and proceeded against in
the commonly used name.59 Note that such a statute does not allow
a suit by an association. Another allows a suit against the associa-
tion to be conducted against an officer as trustee or against the
association in the commonly used name, presumably at the option
of the plaintiff. However, that same state does not allow the suit
by the association to be conducted in the association name, but only
in the name of an officer.
60
By far the majority of statutes which allow suits to be brought
or defended by unincorporated associations in the common name do
not require the transaction of business. Neither do they restrict the
application to suits against the association only, but allow the associa-
tion to sue and be sued in the common name. The federal rule allows
this when the right sought to be enforced by the association or against
the association is a federal right.61 Other states have adopted statutes
similar to the federal rule.62  Not much litigation has developed
out of statutes such as these. Apparently the language is wide enough
to permit sufficient flexibility.
Perhaps the question arises, what effect do the statutes discussed
have on the non-statutory rules permitting suits in these situations?
The decided weight of authority is to the effect that these statutes
are cumulative merely, and do not exclude a class suit if the class
suit could be brought, nor do they exclude a suit against the mem-
bers personally.68 However, although there seems to be no decision
directly in point, several decisions have indicated that the remedy
given by statute is exclusive.64
59. CODE OF LAwS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952, § 10-215.
60. P NNSYLVANIA RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, No. 2153.
61. Rule 17 (b) (1), FEDERAL RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
62. CODE or ALABAMA, 1940, § 7-142; COLORADO RULEs OF CvIi, PROCFDUTRE,
Rule 17 (b); GENERAL STATUTES OF CONNECTICUT, 1949, § 7797; AN.OTATED
CODE OF MARYLAND (Flack 1951), Art. 23, § 134; Compn.LD LAWS OF Micni-
GAN, 1948, § 612.12; MINNESOTA STATuTEs ANNOTATED, § 540.151 (Laws of
1947, c. 527, § 1); NoRTHn DAKOTA REVISED CODE or 1943, § 45-0401; VER-
NON'S TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1948 Supp.) Rule 28; VERMONT
STATUTES or 1947, § 1565; CODE Or VIRGINIA, 1950, § 8-66.
63. McNulty v. Higginbotham, 252 Ala. 218, 40 So. 2d 414 (1949); Jenkin-
son v. Wysner, 125 Mich. 89, 83 N.W. 1012 (1900); Davidson v. Holden, 55
Conn. 103, 10 A. 515 (1887); Lawler v. Murphy, 58 Conn. 294, 20 A. 457
(1889) ; Bennett v. Lathrop, 71 Conn. 613, 42 A. 634 (1899).
64. In Elliot v. Greer Presbyterian Church, 181 S.C. 84, 186 S.E. 651 (1931),
it was said that the remedy was exclusive. However, just what is excluded
is not clear. A suit against one member is not, since under the South Caro-
lina law, liability is joint and several. Medlin v. Ebenezer Church, 132 S.C.
498, 129 S.E. 830 (1925). If a suit against one on his joint and several lia-
bility is not excluded, certainly a suit against all on their joint and several
liability would not be, since if the greater is not excluded, the lesser should
not be. So too, if a suit against all is not excluded, why should a class
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Before leaving the statutes which allow suits to be brought or
defended in the common name, it should be noted that some states, al-
though not by direct legislation, have other statutes which could im-
part suability to the unincorporated association. These statutes usually
appear in the section on service of process. They usually provide
that any unincorporated association which does business in the state
must appoint an agent for service of process.65 Some courts have
held that such statutes allow, by implication, a suit in the common
name against the association.66 These statutes are also discussed
hereinafter in the section on service of process.
Only two things deserve any further consideration. One is the
status of labor unions generally and the formulation of certain rules
peculiar to that type of association. The other is the common statute
in most states allowing an association to enjoin the use of a registered
trade mark.
Since the vast majority of labor unions are unincorporated, what
was said about unincorporated associations generally will apply equal-
ly to them.6 7 It has been held, however, that equity has jurisdiction
in a suit against a labor union in the common name, regardless of
statute.63 Generally speaking though, the contrary is true in most
suit be excluded, where a few sue for the benefit of all? See also Squarre v.
Polk, 153 So. 504 (La. App. 1934), in which the court affirmed an order of
the trial judge sustaining an exception of no cause of action against a peti-
tion which named as defendant seventeen members of the association. How-
ever, the court did not state that the remedy given by statute was exclusive,
although it was stated that the plaintiff should have proceeded under the act.
The holding of the case was that the petition did not state sufficient facts to
constitute a cause of action against the seventeen defendants. Perhaps if the
plaintiff had pleaded more facts, perhaps facts which showed that the defen-
dants had authorized, participated in, or ratified the acts of the associations,
the petition would have stated a cause of action.
However, Professor McMahon interprets the case as holding that the remedy
given by the act is exclusive. See McMahon, Parties Litigant In Louisiana,
10 TULANE L. Rnv. 489, 532 (1936). He characterized the decision as "flag-
rantly erroneous".
The service of process statute as a whole, in which the provision is found
for suing and serving an unincorporated association in Louisiana, has been
held cumulative in another connection. See Curtis v. Jordan, 115 La. 918, 40
So. 334 (1905).
65. GNERAL STATUTES OF NoRTa CAROLINA, § 1-97(6); ARKANSAS STA-
TUTES ANNOTATED, 1947, § 27-609; REVISED LAWS OF NEw HAMPSHIRE, c. 387,
§ 14; REVISED STATUTES OF WASHINGTON, (Remington), § 226 (9).
66. Stafford v. Woods, 234 N.C. 622, 68 S.E. 2d 268 (1951) ; see 30 N. C. L.
REv. 465 (1952). As for suit by an association in North Carolina, see 29
N. C. L. REv. 335 (1951). Accord: Pacific T. Co. v. I.T.U., 125 Wash. 273,
216 Pac. 358, 32 A.L.R. 767 (1923).
67. On this whole matter, see Magill, The Suability of Labor Unions, 1
N. C. L. RiV. 81 (1922), Anno. 27 A.L.R. 786, Supplemented in 149 A.L.R.
508.
68. Newark International Baseball Club, Inc. v. Theatrical Managers, 125
N.J. Eq. 575, 7 A. 2d 170 (1939); Unkovich v. New York Central Railroad
Company, 114 N.J. Eq. 448, 168 AtI. 867 (1933).
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states. And labor unions have been held to come within the pro-
visions of class suits. 69 However, the question still remains as to
whether the class suit may be used in an action at law.
Under a statute allowing suits against an association if it is trans-
acting business in a recognized name, decisions involving labor unions
have gone both ways - some courts allowing the suits, 70 others re-
fusing on the theory that a labor union is not engaged in transacting
business.7 ' Of course, labor unions would come within the pro-
visions of a statute allowing suit in the common name regardless of
the transaction.72 By statute in Florida, suits by and against a labor
union are conducted as if the union were incorporated.73 Some other
states have similar statutes. 74
As is well known, the United States Supreme Court in the case
of United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.,75 held that a labor
union could sue and be sued in the federal courts because a suffici-
ent recognition was granted to the unions by certain acts of the
Congress. Although the decision is not binding upon state courts
regarding their own procedure, some states have expressly adopted
the rule expressed in it,76 while others have rejected it.77 Other
courts, although not expressly adopting the rule, employed similar
reasoning.78 One state allowed a suit in the common name under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, reasoning that Congress had already
69. See note 16 supra. See Schultz v. Chicago Flat Janitors Union, 340
Ill. App. 278, 91 N.E. 2d 471 (1950); Kingsley Amalgamated Meat Cutters,
323 Ill. App. 353, 55 N.E. 2d 554 (1944).
70. St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders Union, 94 Minn. 351, 102
N.W. 725 (1905); Unkovich v. New York Central Ry., supra, note 68.
71. United Brotherhood v. McMurtrey, 179 Okla. 575, 66 P. 2d 1051 (1937).
72. International Brotherhood v. Wood, 162 Va. 517, 175 S.E. 45 (1934).
73. FLORIDA STATUTES ANNOTATED, § 447.11.
74. GENERAL STATUTES o KANSAS, 1949, § 44.811; SOUTH DAKOTA CODE Or
1939, (1952 Supp.) § 17.1102.
75. 259 U. S. 344, 42 S. Ct. 570 (1922). See WARRI N, CORPORATE AD-
VANTAGES WITHOUT INcORPORATioN 648 ff. (1929); cf Dodd, Dogma And
Practice In The Law Of Associations, 42 HARv. L. REv. 977 (1929) ; see 42
HAv. L. REV. 967 (1929).
76. American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 13 Labor
Cases 71,720 (Superior Court, Maricopa County, Arizona, 1947), aff'd (with-
out discussion of this point) American Federation of Labor v. American Sash
& Door Co., 67 Ariz. 189, 189 P. 2d 912 (1948); Vardo v. Whitney, 166 Miss.
663, 147 So. 479 (1933).
77. District No. 21, U.M.W. v. Bourland, 169 Ark. 796, 277 S.W. 546 (1925);
Cahill v. Plumbers, Gas & Steam Fitters Local, 238 Ill. App. 123 (1925).
78. Green County Law Library Ass'n v. Curlett, 76 Ohio App. 337, 63 N. E.
2d 455 (1945); Williams v. United Brotherhood, 39 Ohio 110, 81 Supp. 150
(1948); Clark v. Grand Lodge, 328 Mo. 1084, 43 S.W. 2d 404 (1931); Wil-
liams v. United States Express Co., 195 Mo. App. 935, 191 S.W. 2d 934 (1917) ;
but see Forrest City Mfg. Co. v. International Ladies Garment Workers
Union, 233 Mo. App. 935, 111 S.W. 2d 934 (1938).
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impliedly recognized the entity character of the union.79 Although
the decision was very wide in the beginning, it has been narrowed
and now Rule 17 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides that unless a federal question is involved, capacity is governed
by state law. It seems likely that in those states in which the federal
rules have been adopted, the decision will be followed if and when
the occasion arises.8 0
The last matter to be considered concerns the action by an unin-
corporated association to enjoin the use of a registered trademark or
label. Under the statutes of most states, an association may file
with the Secretary of State any label which it uses and have it
registered if it has not been registered by someone else. Statutes
usually provide that the association has exclusive control and rights
in the registered label or trademark. Generally, statutes also pro-
vide that the association may proceed by way of injunction to stop
the unauthorized use of a trademark thus registered. Some of these
statutes provide for a suit in the common name,8 1 others provide
for the suit to be conducted by an officer for the benefit of the asso-
ciation, 82 while a number of them do not provide how the suit will
be conducted. 83 Presumably in the latter cases, the suit will have
to follow the general rules, and if a general statute is in force which
allows a class suit, or a suit in the common name, or a suit by a cer-
tain designated official on behalf of the association, the suit would
be conducted according to such rules.
79. Williams v. United Mine Workers, 294 Ky. 520, 172 S.W. 2d 202, 149
A.L.R. 505 (1943).
80. See supra, note 23 (states adopting the federal rules). See as an ex-
ample of state legislation dealing with labor unions in such a way as to im-
pliedly recognize it as an entity, IDAHO CODE, Title 44.
81. ANNOTATED CODE OF MARYLAND, (Flack 1951), Art. 27, § 56; Nrw
JERSEY STATUTES ANNOTATED, § 56:3-12.
82. GENERAL STATUTES OF CONNECTICUT, 1949, § 6800; GEORGIA CODE, 1933,
§ 106-104; INDIANA STATUTES ANNOTATED, Burns 1933, § 66-114; IOWA CODE,
§ 548.9; G. S. OF K.ANSAS, 1949, § 81-109; LAWS O MAINE, c. 25, § 50;
MASSACHUSETTS STATUTES, § 110.10; VERNON's ANNOTATED MISSOURI STA-
TUTES, § 417.070; IDAHO CODE, § 44-605; REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947,
§ 94-35-234; NEVADA COMPILED LAWS (Hillyer 1929), § 7696; REVISED LAWS
OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, 1942, c. 207, § 7; OKLAHOMA STATUTES ANNOTATED,
1937, § 78-10; CODE OF LAWS OV SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952, § 66-211; WnLLIAMS
TENNESSEE CODE ANNOTATED, 1934, § 6767; VERNON'S TEXAS CIVIL STATUTES
ANNOTATED, Art. 850; CODE OF VIRGINIA, 1950, § 59-188; WEST VIRGINIA
CODE OF 1949, § 47-2-8; WYOMING COMPILED STATUTES, 1945, § 39-203.
83. FLORIDA STATUTES ANNOTATED, 506.09; MISSISSIPPI CODE OF 1942,
§ 4227-12; REVISED STATUTES OF NEBRASKA, 1943, § 87-109; GENERAL STA-
TUTES OP NORTH CAROLINA, § 80-10; VERMONT STATUTES, 1947, § 7762; DIGEST
OF ARKANSAS STATUTES, (Crawford & Moses 1921) § 10316.
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III. Jurisdiction Over Unincorporated Associations
At the outset, it must be pointed out that in this section the sole
consideration will be, what are the limits to which a state may go in
exercising jurisdiction over unincorporated associations? The in-
quiry is not directed to what the states have done since that has been
treated in the preceding section on parties. But rather, this section
is an inquiry into the position of the outer constitutional limits im-
posed by the "due process" clause of the 14th Amendment as applied
in the field of conflict of laws.
In addition, it must be recalled that for reasons of convenience,
only in personam actions will be considered. Of course, in rem and
quasi-in rem actions are possible against unincorporated associa-
tions, but in those actions, the jurisdiction of the court rests upon
control of the res, not personal jurisdiction over the parties. In the
usual case it is sufficient service of process in the in rem action or
the quasi-in rem action for a notice to be inserted in a local paper
notifying the world of the suit. Thus, in most in rem or quasi-in
rem cases, it matters not if the number of persons concerned in the
res is two or two thousand.
In the following discussion, the states will be divided into three
categories, viz: (1) those in which the common law rules have not
been changed, (2) those where the class suit is available, and (3)
those where a suit in the common name is possible.
In an action at common law, since there is no entity separate and
distinct from the members composing the association, each and every
member of the association is a party defendant. Therefore, each and
every member of the association must be brought into court per-
sonally, either by a service *of process personally, or by a domicil
service if that is permitted.84
Likewise, in class suits, since the action was and is in equity, and
since traditionally equity acts only in personam, there must be a per-
sonal service of process upon the persons who are named as de-
fendants on behalf of themselves and all other members of the
association, or a domicil service if that is permitted.8 5
However, in actions under statutes allowing suits in the common
name by express directions or by implied provisions, or by statutes
recognizing the entity sufficiently to allow suits in the common name,
84. West v. R. & 0. Railway Co., 103 W.Va. 417, 137 S.E. 654 (1927),
RXSTATEMSNT, CONFLICT or LAws, § 86, comment a (1934). As to jurisdic-
tion quasi-in rem, see Rodier v. Fay, 7 N.Y.S. 2d 744 (1938).
85. West v. B. & 0. Ry., supra, note 4; Simpson v. Grand International
Brotherhood, 83 W.Va. 355, 98 S.E. 580 (1919).
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or by statutes providing for actions against the president or other
officer as trustee ad litem, the scant authority upon the point seems
to place the association in the same category as partnerships, and
requires a doing of business.8 6 Some of the state statutes expressly
require a transaction of business before the statute allowing suit in
the common name applies.87 Others make no mention of this re-
quirement.88 As pointed out in the section on parties, this require-
ment could have two possible meanings, only one of which is rele-
vant here, that is, the doing of any acts in the furtherance of the
purpose for which it was organized. This, of course, includes profit
and non-profit enterprises, as well as charitable and religious ones.
However, as suggested at the outset, just where each individual state
has set the limit for its own courts is not of concern here, the ma-
terial consideration being where the constitutional outer limits are
placed.
Of course, the basic question is, what is "doing business"? It
seems that the Restatement has intended that the phrase as used
therein means the same as applied to foreign corporations.8 9 Good-
rich seems to think that the same rules should apply to an unincor-
porated association as are applied to partnerships.9 0 However, it
seems that both of these are lacking in some particulars, since both
foreign corporations and partnerships are usually engaged in business
of a commercial nature, whereas unincorporated associations may not
be. On the whole, it seems that the test set forth in a comment in the
Southern California Law Review would be more desirable.9 ' The
author, discussing a section of the California Code of Civil Procedure
and the different interpretations placed upon the phrase "Transac-
tion of business" in the California statute says:
Whenever, therefore, two or more individuals unite for any pur-
pose, and such association, as a unit, performs any act of busi-
ness or enters into any obligation, whether it be permanent or
temporary, whether pursuant to a primary purpose or merely in-
86. REISTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 86 (1934); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS, § 74 (1949); see McGruder & Foster, Jurisdiction over Partnerships,
Nonparinershif Associations, and Joint Debtors, 37 HARV. L. REv. 793 (1924);
Holdoegel, Jurisdiction over Partnerships, 11 IowA L. Rev. 193 (1926).
87. See notes 30 and 31 supra.
88. See notes 55 and 56 supra.
89. RESTATM4ZNT, CONFLIcT OF LAWS, § 86 (1934).
90. GOODRICH, CONFLICT Ov LAWS, § 74 (3rd ed. 1949).
91. 5 So. CAL_ L. Rsv. 421 (1932); See Pacific T. Co. v. I.T.U., 125 Wash.
273, 216 Pac. 358 (1923); RnSTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws, § 167, comment
a (1934).
[Vol. 7
19
Brunson: Some Problems Presented by Unincorporated Associations in Civil P
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS PROBLEMS
cidental in character, then, as to such act or obligation it has
transacted business within the terms of the statute.
Regarding the types of causes of action against an association
which should be amenable to the jurisdiction of a court of a state
in which it has done business, it has been suggested, by analogy to
the principles regarding foreign corporations, that the association
can be sued in the common name under the statutes only after doing
business in that state, and only for causes of action arising in that
state.92 This conclusion proceeds from the argument that the only
reason that such suits are allowed in the first place is to protect eco-
nomic interests within the forum state, and that when the cause of
action arises outside the state, no such reason exists, and that there-
fore, no suit can be maintained. However, this objection should
not apply to a class suit, or to suits against all members.
Since the matter under consideration is deemed waivable in the
ordinary case of any person, natural or artificial, it has been held,
in accordance with other general principles, that if the association
appears and defends the suit, it waives the jurisdiction over the
person.98
IV. Venue in Actions Against Unincorporated Associations
For purposes of convenience the type of case which is con-
sidered in this section will again be limited to in personam actions.
If it is desired that an action be brought against an association to
foreclose a mortgage, or to try title to realty, the question of venue
will not be unique to the unincorporated association, for in such
cases, the action generally must be brought in the county where the
land lies.9 4 That requirement of venue, which could be compared
to jurisdiction over the subject matter rather than the venue of the
suit, cuts across the whole field. In this section, it is assumed that
the suit is transitory in character, but for historical reasons, certain
rules of venue have been developed.
For the purposes of this section, a three-fold division has been
made. In the first class are those situations where the common law
rule of compulsory joinder has not been changed. Secondly, those
92. Holdoegel, J$trisdiction over Partnerships, 11 IOwA L. REv. 193 (1926).
93. Baird v. National Health Foundation, 235 Mo. App. 594, 144 S.W. 2d
850 (1940).
94. See, for example, ALABAMA CODE, 1940, § 7054; CALIFORNIA CODZ OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 392(1) (a); IDAHO CODE, 1947, § 5-401; Art. 163 LOUIS,-
ANA CODE OF PRACTICE; Mississippi CoDE, 1942, § 1433; MONTANA CODE, 1947,
§ 93-2901; CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952, § 10-301.
19553
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol7/iss3/4
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
states which have a class action will be considered, and lastly, those
states in which the common law rule has been ipodified to permit
suit in the common name, either by statutes or by judicial decisions.
It should be obvious that in those states in which the traditional
common law principles prevail, questions of venue will be solved by
the general rules of venue, applicable to all cases. This would apply
to cases in chancery, or to cases of an equitable nature. Hence, it
is not necessary to discuss all the rules of venue, since, if the action
is against all members at law, or against a few for the benefit of all
in equity, general rules of venue will apply, just as they apply
whenever there exists a plurality of defendants. Suffice it for the
purposes of this section to point out only the most general and com-
mon.
It is almost universally conceded that if an action is against more
than one defendant, venue is proper if laid in the county where one
of the defendants resides.95 Accordingly, in the ordinary situation
in which all members of an association are sued as defendants, venue
would be where one member resides, subject, of course, to all the
general rules pertaining to the change of venue. The same rule
would apply if the nature of the suit allowed a class action, or if
class actions applied to actions at law as well as suits in equity.
However, in some cases, possibly for geographical reasons, venue is
proper if laid in a county where one party resides.96 Thus, in such
a case, venue could be where the plaintiff resides. But, regardless
of the finer rules, it is to be emphasized that in suits in equity or
actions at law against all members, general rules of venue are ap-
plied, not any rules which are peculiar to unincorporated associa-
tions.
In addition to the foregoing rules, it is common in many states
to provide that an action may be brought where the cause of action,
or a part thereof, arose.97 Since this is a general rule of venue,
it would apply to suits against unincorporated associations. Other
provisions in many states allow a suit to be brought where the con-
95. See, for illustrative purposes only, ALABAMA CODE, 1947, § 7-54; CAi.z-
rORwIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 395; FLORIDA STATUTES ANNOTATED,
§ 46.01 Art. 165(6); LOUISIANA CODE OF PRACTICE (if joint or solidary
obligors) ; GENERAL LAWS op RHODE ISLAND, 1938, c. 511, § 2; CODE op LAWS
OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952, § 10-303.
96. GENERAL STATUTES OF CONNECTICUT, 1949, § 7747; REvIsED STATUTES
Olt MAINE, 1944, c. 99, § 9; ANNOTATED LAWS OF MASSACHUSETS, § 223-1;
GENERA, LAWS OF RHODE ISLAND, 1938, c. 511, § 2; VERMONT STATUTES,
1947, § 1286, 1604.
97. CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 395(1).
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tract is to be performed,98 or where it was entered into. These
rules, being general, also would apply to unincorporated associations.
In states where suability has been developed by judicial decision,
there seems as yet no clear cut answer as to whether the association
is treated as a corporation merely for purposes of becoming a party
to a suit, or whether the corporate treatment will be consistently
carried out, allowing a suit to be brought against an association where
it does business. It would seem that the argument which prevails
upon the courts in regard to corporate treatment for purposes of
becoming a party should be equally, if not more, persuasive to solve
a question of venue. That is, if the legislature has dealt with unin-
corporated associations in such a way as to force the conclusion that
that body intended corporate treatment for the purposes of suing
and being sued, it would also follow that the legislature intended
the corporate treatment to be carried out consistently.9 9 But, as yet,
there seems to be no clear cut answer to the question.10 0
In those states which have statutory provisions imparting sua-
bility in the common name, there seem to be two basic types of
statutes. One type provides that the members of the association
may be sued in the common name, thus implying, at least, that the
real defendants are the members, even though they are being sued
in the common name.10 1 The other type of statute seems really to
create an entity, separate and apart from the members, by providing
that "the association" may be sued in the common name.102 If there
is any real distinction here, it would seem to indicate that in the first
type, venue would be proper if laid in a county where one member
resides, under general rules of venue, because the members are the
defendants, though being sued under the common name. In the
latter type, the implication would be more favorable for a corpor-
ate treatment, since the statute provides for a suit against "the
association".
On the other hand, if statutes provide for venue in cases against
unincorporated associations, they should be followed, although such
98. CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION OF 1879, Art. XII, § 16; RvIsEn CODMS O
MONTANA, 1947, § 93-2904.
99. Adams Express Co. v. Schofield, 111 Ky. 832, 64 S.W. 903 (1901).
100. The case of Vardo v. Whitney, 166 Miss. 663, 147 So. 479 (1933),
could be considered only for its implications. In that case, a suit was brought
against an association where one of the branch offices had an office. However,
the point was not passed upon, and one cannot be sure that no members re-
sided in that county.
101. See notes 30 and 31 supra.
102. See note 56 ff. supra. But see Sperry Products v. Association of Ameri-
,can Railroads, 132 F. 2d 408, 145 A.L.R. 694 (1942).
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statutes have been held cumulative and not exclusive. 103 In states
where the statute provides for a suit against "the association", sup-
plementary statutes usually,' ° 4 but not universally,' 0 5 accord corpor-
ate treatment as regards venue. However, if the statute does not
provide for venue, or its provisions are cumulative merely, then it
will be a question for judicial decision as to whether corporate
treatment will be accorded.
In states where the suit is not against the association in the com-
mon name, but rather against a member or a statutorily designated
official as trustee ad litem for purposes of the suit, it would seem that
in the absence of statutory provisions for venue, the residence of
the named officer would govern.' 06
Obviously, if the statute provides in so many words that certain
associations may sue and be sued as corporations,' 0 7 or that it is
deemed a corporation for the purpose of holding property, and may
be sued in such corporate capacity,' 08 the association may be sued
in any county in which it could be sued if it were a corporation.
V. Service of Process Upon Unincorporated Associations
In an action against the members of an unincorporated association
at common law the usual rules of service of process would apply,
and to confer jurisdiction, the members of the association must be
named as parties and process must be served upon each of them in-
dividually.'0 9 Thus, the general rule applies that the process must
be handed to the defendant or read to him as in the usual case.' 1 0
Moreover, service upon some individual members of the association
will not be sufficient to support a suit against all members."' Ser-
103. Edgpr v. Southern Railway, 213 S.C. 445, 49 S.E. 2d 841 (1948); But
cf. REvisED STATUTES OF NEBRASKA, 1943, § 25-314; PENNSYLVANIA RULES
or CIVIL PROCIEDuRE, No. 21F6, where restrictive language is used.
104. ALABAMA CODE, 1940, § 7-57; ARKANSAS STATUTES OF 1947, § 27-609;
ANNOTATED CODE OF MARYLAND, (Bagby) Art. 23, § 104; REVISED STATUTES
OF NEBRASKA, 1943, § 25-314; PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
No. 2156; VERNON'S TEXAS CIVIL STATUTES ANNOTATED, Art. 1995 (a).
105. NEW JERSEY STATUTES ANNOTATED, 2A :64-1; CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1952, § 10-429.
106. Bacon v. Dinsmore, 42 How. Prac. 368 (1912).
107. FLORIDA STATUTES ANNOTATED, § 447.11.
108. REVISED LAWS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, 1942, c. 242, § 11.
109. West v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 103 W.Va. 417, 137 S.E. 654
(1927).
110. See, as illustrative statutes, ARKANSAS STATUTES OF 1946, § 27-330;
CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 411 (8); IowA RULES OF" CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE, No. 56(a) ; VERNON'S ANNOTATED MISSOURI STATUTES, § 506.150(1) ;
NEw YORK CIVIL PRACTIcE AcT, § 225; CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
1952, § 10-438.
111. Johnson v. Albritton, 101 Fla. 1285, 134 So. 563 (1931).
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vice upon a mere agent is likewise insufficient to bring the associa-
tion into court, in the absence of statutory authority.
1 12
However, in accordance with the doctrine of virtual representa-
tion, a part of the members of an association may defend for the
benefit of all. In such cases, service upon the part acting for all is
sufficient." 8l
In some states, where, by direct legislation, associations are suable
as an entity or in the common name, supplementary statutes gener-
ally provide that service may be had upon an officer,11 4 a managing
official or general agent, 115 an agent,
116 or a member or associate.11 7
These statutes have been generally held constitutional." 8
In some states, although direct legislation has imparted suability
in the common name, there are no supplementary statutes dealing
with service of process. Rather than hold that a lack of statutory
authority regarding service of process is to be used as a shield by
the association, the courts have sometimes held that they are to be
treated as quasi-corporations for the purpose of service of process. 119
In states which have statutes embodying a forced statutory repre-
112. Baskin v. U.M.W., 150 Ark. 398, 234 S.W. 464 (1921) ; Staed v. State,
64 Mo. App. 28 (1895) ; Tucker v. Eaugough, 186 N.C. 505, 120 S.E. 57 (1923).
113. Evenson v. Spaulding, 150 Fed. 517 (1907) ; Fitzpatrick v. Rutter, 160
Ill. 282, 43 N.E. 392 (1896) ; Slaughter v. American Baptist Publication So-
ciety, 150 S.W. 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912); National Harness Mfg. Ass'n v.
F.T.C., 268 Fed. 705 (1920); Bayci v. Rangp, 304 Ill. App. 203, 25 N.E. 2d
1015 (1940).
114. ALABAMA CODE, 1940, § 7-144; GENERAL STATUTES OF CONNECTICUT,
§ 7776; ANNOTATED CODE OF MARYLAND (Bagby 1924) Art. 23, § 104; Co.I-
PILED LAWS OF MICHIGAN, 1948, § 613.29; NsV JERSEY STATUTES ANNOTATED,
2A:64-2; NEW M'JExico STATUTES or 1941, § 19-101(4) (o); PENNSYLVANIA
RULES o CIVIL PROCEDURE, No. 2156; TEXAS CIVIL STATUTES ANNOTATED, Art.
1995(23) ; UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, No. 4(e) (4) ; CODE OF VIRGINIA,
1950, § 8-66.
115. COLORADO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, No. 4 (e) (3); FLORIDA STA-
TUTES ANNOTATED, § 447.11 (labor unions only); GENERAL STATUTES OF
KANSAS, 1949, § 44-811; (labor unions only); LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES
OF 1950, 13:3471 (22); REVISED STATUTES OF NEBRASKA, 1943, § 25-314; also,
many of the statute- noted in note 114 contain alternatives so that they could
come under this note also.
116. CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 388; CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1952, § 10-429; VERMONT STATUTES, 1947, § 1565; also, statutes
under notes 114 and 115 might come under this note.
117. CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 388; IDAHO CODE, § 5-323;
MINNESOTA STATUTES ANNOTATED, § 540.15: REVISED CODES OF MONTANA,
1947, § 93-2827; NEVADA COMPILED LAWS, (Hillyer 1929) § 8564; NORTH
DAKOTA REVIsED CODE OF 1943, § 28-0609; OKLAHOMA STATUTES ANNOTATED,
1937, § 12-182; also, some statutes noted in notes 114, 115 and 116 would also
come Inder this note.
118. Jardine v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. Dec. 188, 2 P. 2d 756 (1931);
Bobe v. Lloyds, 10 F. 2d 730 (1926); Ex parte Baylor, 93 S.C. 414, 77 S.E.
59 (1913); F. R. Patch Mfg. Co. v. Capeless, 79 Vt. 1, 63 At. 938 (1906).
119. Hamilton v. Delaware Motor Trades, 4 W.W. Harr. 486, 155 At. 595
(Del. 1931).
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sentative concept, allowing a member or an officer to sue or be sued
on behalf of the association, it would ordinarily follow that in ac-
cordance with general principles, a service of process must be had
upon the named trustee ad litem. However, some courts have held
that the named officer or member being sued on behalf of the asso-
ciation is not the only one upon whom service may be had, the statute
being cumulative merely. 120 Other states having the same type of
statute have supplementary statutes expressly prescribing upon whom
a service may be had.' 2 ' These statutes generally adopt a corporate
theory and analogous rules apply.
In some states there are no statutes which set up the capacity
of an unincorporated association to sue or be sued; yet, in the
part of the statutes which deals with service of process, certain pro-
visions will be found which prescribe how service of process is to
be accomplished in an action against an unincorporated association.' 22
These statutes are so worded as to allow actions against the associa-
tion in the common name, and some of the courts in such states
have so held.'28 Two forms are generally assumed by these statutes.
One type simply prescribes that service may be accomplished by serv-
ing a managing official or general agent, at the usual place of business,
during a business day.12 4  The less common types prescribe that
any unincorporated association wishing to transact business within the
state must, before performing any of the acts for which it was
formed, appoint an agent for service of process. 12 5 Presumably, a
suit could then be brought against the association in the common
name with service of process upon the appointed agent. In addi-
tion, some statutes provide that if the association fails to so appoint
an agent, service of process may be had upon the secretary of state
120. McGinn v. Morrin, 158 Misc. 666, 286 N.Y.S. 410; aff'd 247 App. Div.
770, 286 N.Y.S. 411 (1936).
121. PtNNSYLVANIA RuLts OF CvmL PRoczmvua No. 2157 (a).
122. ARIZONA CODE ANNiOrATD, 1939, § 21-305 (if subject to suit in firm
name only, see supra note 76); ARIZONA CODE ANNOTATED, 1939, § 53-702;
ARKANSAS STATUTES OF 1947, § 27-609; VERNON's ANNOTATED MISSOURI STA-
TUTES, § 506.150 (if subject to suit in firm name only, see supra note 78);
RvisED LAWS or NExv HAMPSHM, 1942, c. 387, § 14; REMmINGTON'P 'E-
VISED STATUTES OF WASHINGTON, § 226 (9).
123. Stafford v. Woods, 234 N.C. 622, 68 S.E. 2d 263 (1951); Pacific T.
Co. v. I.T.U., 125 Wash. 273, 216 Pac. 358 (1923).
124. See note 122 supra. Also, see LA. REv. STAT. OF 1950, 13:3471 (22).
125. GEORGIA CODE, 1933, § 56-1621 (fraternal benefit societies); Mississippi
CoDE, 1942, § 5760 (fraternal insurance companies); GENERAL STATUTES or
NORTH CAROLINA, § 1-97 (all associations) ; RE!MINGTON's RE VsED STATUTES
OF WASHINGTON, § 226 (9); WILLiAls TENNESSEE CODE ANNOTATED, 1934,
§ 8681.1.
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or some other state functionary. 12 6  Others are silent as to the con-
sequence of non-appointment, but the courts have uniformly held
that in such cases, process may be served as if the association were
a foreign corporation, 12 7 that is, upon some person whose character
is such that it is expected that he will give notice of the suit to the
association.
2 8
In the final category there are neither statutes allowing asso-
ciations to sue or be sued as a unit, nor statutes prescribing how
service of process may be accomplished in a suit against an asso-
ciation; yet, for other reasons, such as implied recognition by the
legislature, suits allowed in the common name, or estoppel, or waiver,
the question of ser-ice is usually solved by resort to the statutory
provisions regarding service upon corporations.'
29
VI. Execution of Judgments Against Unincorporated Associations
In this area a three-fold division is again to be made. First, con-
sideration will be given to the execution of a judgment obtained
against the members of an association in an action at common law;
second, to the execution of a judgment as it relates to class suits;
and finally, certain problems of execution when the judgment is
against the association as an entity, or against an officer as trustee.
In actions at common law, it has already been observed that all
members must be made parties. Therefore, the suit is against every
member individually, and the judgment binds each member, both
as to all joint property, and as to any individual property. The ra-
tionalization for this is that each member is a personal defendant,
each has been served with process, each has had his day in court,
and each has had an opportunity to be heard.
With the development of the class suit, equity was forced to re-
treat from the ordinary rule that only parties are bound by decrees,
126. GENERAL STATuTEs OF NORTH CAROLINA, § 1-97; WILLIAMs TENNESSIM
CODE ANNOTATED, 8681.1.
127. Heralds of Liberty v. Bowen, 8 Ga. App. 325, 68 S.E. 1008, (1910);
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Agnew, 170 Miss. 604, 155 So. 205
(1934).
128. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Agnew, 170 Miss. 604, 155 So.
205 (1934).
129. Sprainis v. Lietuwishika Evangelishka Liuterishka Draughstes, 232 Ill.
App. 427 (1924) ; Fitzpatrick v. Rutter, 160 Ill. 282, 43 N.E. 392 (1875) ; Adams
Express Co. v. Schofield, 111 Ky. 832, 64 S.W. 903 (1901); Adams Express Co.
v. State, 55 Ohio St. 69, 44 N.E. 506 (1896) ; Undovich v. New York Central
Railroad Co., 114 N.J. Eq. 448, 168 At]. 667 (1933). (It should be noted that
statutes in New Jersey now allow suits in the common name, at least if it is
a commercial association) ; Slaughter v. American Baptist Publications Society,
150 S.W. 224 (Texas 1912). (It should be noted that statutes allow suits in
the common name in Texas today.)
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and such doctrines as virtual representation and privity of interest
were formulated to rationalize the results. Ultimately, therefore,
the idea of a personal service of a subpoena receded in importance.
However, in actions at law, there was no development of a class
suit, hence, no retreat from the rule that only parties are bound by
judgments. In time, the ideas became crystalized, so that today the
idea of a personal service of process is so closely linked with a person-
al judgment for the payment of a sum of money that it has been
raised to constitutional grounds.
130
Thus, in a class suit which was formulated by statute and in some
cases allowed in an action at law, it is only natural and inevitable
that the question will arise as to whether, in such a suit at law, a
personal judgment can be rendered against a person not a personal
defendant or party, but one who is merely represented, i.e., one of
the class. It is thus to be observed that most problems concerning
the fusion of law and equity do not revolve around the fusion of the
substantive law, but rather around the fusion of the procedures. In
many states today the right of a jury trial depends upon the case's
being one at law and not in equity, regardless of the fact that there
may be but one form of action, and that the equity court is the same as
the law court.
In its historical setting, it is generally said that all members of
the class are bound by the judgment in a class suit.131 However, if
those cases are examined, none will be found in which a person was
held personally liable for the payment of money if the suit is against
130. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165 (U.S. 1851); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. 714 (1877).
131. Litchfield v. Goodnow, 123 U.S. 549 (1897); Supreme Tribe of Ben
Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 353 (1921) ; Jacobs v. Murphy, 245 Ala. 260, 16 So.
2d 859 (1944); Grand International v. Mills, 43 Ariz. 379, 31 P. 2d 971
(1934); Higsby v. Ruraldale Consolidated School District, 180 Ark. 122, 20
S.W. 2d 624 (1929); Grief v. Dullea, 65 Cal. App. 2d 986, 153 P. 2d 581
(1944) ; New Britain Trust Co. v. Stanley, 128 Conn. 386, 23 A. 2d 142 (1941);
Denegre v. Walker, 214 Ill. 114, 73 N.E. 408 (1905) ; Gavin v. Curtin, 171
111. 640, 49 N.E. 523 (1898) ; Buchan v. German American Land Co., 180 Iowa
911, 164 N.W. 118 (1917); Masonic Widows and Orphans v. Hicatt Brothers,
197 Ky. 301, 247 S.W. 34 (1923) ; Malloy v. Carrol, 287 Mass. 227, 190 N.E.
113 (1934); Quinton's Marker Inc. v. Patterson, 303 Mass. 227, 191, 21 N.E.
2d 546 (1939) ; Mathews v. Lighter, 84 Miss. 333. 88 N.W. 8892 (1902);
Acord v. Beaty, 244 Mo. 126, 148 S.W. 901 (1912) ; Brenner v. Title Guaran-
tee & Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E. 2d 890 (1937) ; Downey v. Sein, 185
N.Y. 427, 78 N.E. 66 (1906) ; Hunt v. Gower, 80 S.C., 80, 61 S.E. 218 (1908) ;
Bernard v. Bernard, 79 S.C. 364, 60 S.E. 700 (1908); Dewey v. St. Albans
Trust Co., 60 Vt. 1, 12 Atl. 224 (1888) ; O'Hara v. Pittston Co., 187 Wash.
282, 166 Pac. 665 (1917) ; Boal v. Wood, 170 W. Va. 383, 73 S.E. 978 (1912) ;
see also 8 L.R.A. (N.S.) 51; 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 437; 97 Am. St. Rep. 766, 2
Ann. Cases 791; RESTATE IrNT, JUDGMENTS, § 86 (1942); 26 WASH. U. L. REv.
422 (1941) ; 3 MOORE, FEDtRAL PRACTIcE, 3456 ff. (2d ed. 1948).
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a class only. The cases which announce the above rule are all equity
cases, or at least, none permit the judgment to run against a mem-
ber of the class personally for a money judgment when he was not
a party, and only virtually represented.
The degree to which members of a class are bound by judgments
varies with each type of class suit.1 3 2  The so-called "hybrid class
action," 138 and the "spurious"'1 4 class suit bind only formal parties
of record.'8 5  In the so-called "true class suit," however, it is
generally said that the judgment binds every member of the class.'
3 6
Since actions against unincorporated associations are classified as
true class actions, the rules pertaining thereto will apply.'i 7 How-
ever, even in the "true class suit," the degree and extent to which
each member of the class is bound is in doubt, for the reasons pointed
out earlier. As to suits equitable in nature, they are probably bound
personally.'38 In actions at law involving a class suit, one would
probably be bound as to jointly owned property or a commonly owned
interest. But as to his individual property it seems very doubtful
that he is bound.
The reasons could probably be found historically and constitu-
tionally.
140
However, as to the persons named as representatives, the court
has sufficient jurisdiction over them to render a personal judgment
against them, since they are parties, and were personally served.
141
Therefore, at the present time, about all that can be said about
this particular problem is that the members of an unincorporated
association are probably personally bound by a judgment rendered
against the class, if the suit was of an equitable nature, but if it
commands the payment of a sum of money, then the members not per-
sonally served and not made parties are not personally liable as
132. For discussion of the different types of class suits, see 22 MINN. L.
Rv.'34 (1938).
133. 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 3442 (2d ed. 1948).
134. See note 133 supra.
135. 3 MooRE, FEDRAL PRAcTIcr 3456, 3465, 3468 (2d ed. 1948).
136. For a discussion of a "true class suit," see 3 MooRm, FEDERAL PRACTrCE
3434 (2d ed. 1948) ; see also note 131 supra.
137. 2 MOORE, FEDERA PRAcirIce 2236 (1st ed. 1938).
138. See note 131 supra.
139. Blank.
140. In his concurring opinion in Montgomery Ward v. Langer, 168 F. 2d
182 (1948), Judge Johnson said, at page 189:
"No one, I am sure, has ever previously believed under the old equitable
class action, that a federal court was entitled, on the basis of class representa-
tion alone, to enter a personal judgment of pecuniary liability against an in-
dividual who was in no other manner brought into court."
141. RESTATEM NT, JUDGMENTS, § 86, comment (i) (1942).
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to their individual property, although they are probably liable to the
extent of their interest in any jointly owned property.
The statutes which allow suits against an association in the com-
mon name, or against an officer as trustee for the association, very
generally provide that the judgment binds the joint property.142 In
those states where no statute prescribes the effect of a judgment
against an association in the common name, the same result would
probably be reached upon analogies to corporations.
In addition, some statutes prescribe that the individual property
of those served is bound, 14
3 whereas others prohibit it.
144
In regard to the liability of the individual property of an indi-
vidual not served, it would seem that the same constitutional prob-
lems would be met here as are encountered in the class suit. In the
few opinions addressing themselves to the subject, the courts have
found ways to sidestep the issue.145 Some states expressly forbid
the liability of individual property for a judgment against an asso-
ciation.1 4 6
In both of these situations, class suits or associations sued in the
common name, it has been suggested that a difference should be
made between residents of the forum state and non-residents thereof.
As to residents, it is argued, the court has jurisdiction by virtue of
their residence 14 7 and the only requirement of due process is notice
142. ALABAMA CODE, 1940, § 7-145; CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
§ 388; COLORADO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 54 (e); GENERAL STATUTES
oF CONNECTICUT, 1949, § 8035; REVIsED CODE OF DELAWARE, 1935, § 4676;
FLORIDA STATUTES ANNOTATED, § 447.11 (labor unions only); IDAHO CODE,
1947, § 5-323; GENERAL STATUTES or KANSAS, 1947, § 44.811 (labor unions
only); ANNOTATED CODE OF MARYLAND (Bagby 1924) Art. 23, § 104; MINNE-
SOTA STATUTES ANNOTATED, § 540.151; REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947,
§ 93-2827; REVISED STATUTES OF NEBRASKA, 1943, § 25-314; NEW JERSEY
STATUTES ANNOTATED, § 2A :64-3; NEW YORK GENERAL ASSOCIATIONS LAW,
§ 15; NEVADA COMPILED LAWS (Hillyer 1929), § 8564; NORTH DAKOTA REVISED
CODE Or 1943, § 45-0402; OKLAHOMA STATUTES ANNOTATED, 1937, § 12-182;
PENNSYLVANIA RULES or CIVIL PROCEDURE, No. 2158; GENERAL LAWS OF
RHODE ISLAND, 1938, c. 530, § 4; CODE or LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952
§ 10-1516; TENNESSEE CODE ANNOTATED (Williams 1934) § 8681.3; TEXAS
REVISED CIVIL STATUTES ANNOTATED, Article 6136; UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, No. 4(e) (4) ; VERMONT STATUTES, 1947, § 1672; CODE OF VIRGINIA,
1950, § 8-66.
143. CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 398; DELAWARE CODE ANNO-
TATED, § 10-3904; IDAHO CODE, § 5-323; REVISED CODE OF MONTANA, 1947,
§ 93-2821; NEVADA COMPILED LAWS, (Hillyer 1929) § 8564; OKLAHOMA
STATUTES ANNOTATED, 1937, § 20-182; UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule
17 (d); SOUTH DAKOTA CODE, 1939, § 33.0408.
144. NEW YORK GENERAL ASSOCIATIONS LAW, § 15.
145. Jardine v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. 301, 2 P. 2d 756 (1931).
146. GENERAL STATUTES OF CONNECTICUT, 1949, § 8035; GENERAL LAWS OF
RHODE ISLAND, c. 530, § 4.
147. RESTATEMENT, CONFLIcT OF LAWS, § 71 (1) (b) (1934).
[Vol. 7
29
Brunson: Some Problems Presented by Unincorporated Associations in Civil P
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
UNINCORPORATED AssocIATIoNs PROBIEMS
of the suit and an opportunity to defend and be heard. 148 The ar-
gument thus boils the problem down to this: was service upon the
representatives of the class or upon the official of the association rea-
sonable notice and opportunity to defend to the rest of the class or
to the rest of the members? If so, then as to residents, a personal
judgment could be entered against them without service of process.
However, the problem is not solved as to non-residents.
One state has a statute which provides that after judgment has
gone against the association in the common name, any joint property
of the association members, or the individual property of any mem-
ber may be levied upon for satisfaction of the judgment, without
any further notice or proceeding. 149 The highest court of the state
has sustained the validity of the statute, without mentioning the resi-
dence.' 50 However, considerable doubt has been cast upon the con-
stitutionality of the statute, and the soundness of the case. 151
Most authorities indicate that the proper method to be used to
reach individual property of members is by a new suit against the
member, with the usual service of process. 152 This method certain-
ly would be the safest, and in the absence of a statute, would pro-
bably be the only way. Whether or not such a suit would lie, from
a substantive point of view, is, of course, important, but it is out-
side the scope of this article. If the state has held the statute which
allows a suit against the association in the common name to be an
exclusive remedy, then apparently the individual liability of the mem-
ber has been erased, and in its place there has been substituted joint
liability.
The statutes which deal with the problem of enforcing a judg-
ment against the association and against individual members general-
ly provide that in the subsequent suit, there must be shown a judg-
ment against the association, the insufficiency of the joint property,
148. 29 N. C. L. Rev. 337 (1951).
149. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 10-1516.
150. Ex parte Baylor, 93 S.C. 414, 77 S.E. 59 (1913).
151. See WARRuN, CoaRoATT ADVANTAGZs WITHOUT INcORPORATIoN 554
(1929); see also 29 N. C. L. Rzv. 337 (1951).
152. Judge Johnson, in his concurring opinion in Montgomery Ward v.
Langer, 163 F. 2d 182 (1948) said, at p. 190:
• ..Such an adjudication (class suit resulting in a judgment) could pro-
bably also be made to serve as a foreclosure of all questions against the members
of the union as a group, leaving open only the question, in favor of each in-
dividual, who might be subsequently sued and served with summons as a basis
for a personal judgment, whether he had participated in, authorized or ratified
such wrongful acts as the union was found to have committed." See also
Davidson v. Holdon, 55 Conn. 103, 10 Atl. 515 (1887); Patch Mfg. Co. v.
Capeless, 79 Vt. 1, 63 Atl. 938 (1906); Tarbell v. Gifford, 79 Vt. 369, 65
Atl. 80 (1906).
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and any other fact going to make up individual liability, such as the
individual's authorization, participation, or ratification of the acts.153
In states where such a statute is not in force, the question will
come up as to the effect to be given to the prior judgment against
the association in the subsequent suit against an individual member.
Usually, since the defendant in the subsequent suit was a member of
the association, or a member of the class which had been sued, he
will be in privity of interest with the prior defendants, and the prior
judgment will be res judicata against him as to facts actually liti-
gated in the prior suit.154 However, this does not mean that he
must satisfy the judgment out of his individual property, since his
membership, authorization, participation, or ratification of the asso-
ciation or its acts were not litigated in the prior suit. Therefore,
as to these matters, he has a right to prove what he can and has a
right to be heard. Thus, it is to be observed that all elements of
substantive liability must be made out against him, if individual lia-
bility is sought. As to facts litigated in the prior suit, such as the
actual commission of the acts, their tortious character, causation,
and the amount and existence of damages should be res judicata.
A similar result should follow in contract suits, the difference re-
quiring merely the individual authorization, participation, or ratifica-
tion of the acts of the association.
VII. Conclusions and Recommendations
It will be readily seen that there are defects in the methods em-
ployed by various states to solve the questions and problems con-
sidered.
In the section on parties it was shown that the common law rule
of compulsory joinder is not workable today, since the membership
of an unincorporated association may number in the thousands. De-
vices which have attempted a partial solution to this problem, such
as estoppel and waiver, are not satisfactory, because they are only
stop-gap and make-shift provisions.
Equally apparent is the fact that the equitable class suit, while
better than the common law rule, is not the best solution. True, it
does circumvent the compulsory joinder rule, but in doing so the
153. See note 152 supra. Also, see RavrsED STATUTeS OF NEBRASKA, 1943,
§ 25-316; NEW Jas, STATUTs ANNOTATED, § 2A :64-4; Nzw YORK GENERAL
AssociATroNS LAW, § 16; GENERAL LAWS Or Raomp ISLAND, 1938, c. 530, § 4;
VERMONT STATUTES OF 1947, § 1672; TEXAS RevisFD CIVIL STATUTES AxNo-
TATED, Art. 6137.
154. See RESTATEMENT, JUDe.MENTS, § 86 (1934). Also, see the concurring
opinion of Mr. Judge Johnson in Montgomery Ward v. Langer, 163 V. Zd 182,
(1948).
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litigant must run the risk of mis-naming representative defendants:
he is presumed to know which people will adequately represent the
interests of the whole, a situation which may very well be false.
Added to this is the doubt that a class suit may be permitted in an
action at law, whether it has been reduced to statutory form or not.
The most direct and effective answer to the problem must, of
course, be legislation. True, judicial decisions could reach the result,
but such progress is slow and often filled with technicalities which
are given up but slowly. Added to this is the necessity for some
degree of predictability. These factors, it seems, demand legislation.
Of the statutes which are passed to deal with the problem, the
best would be one which did not limit its application to any special
type of association, or require the transaction of business, or re-
quire that the suit be on an obligation incurred for the benefit of
the members. It should be so phrased as to be cumulative, and should
allow suits to be brought by the association as well as against it.
Such a statute might be as follows: "Unincorporated associations
may sue and be sued in their common names upon any cause of
action."
The problem of the unincorporated association in the field of con-
flict of laws centers around in personam actions. Since this is pri-
marily a constitutional question, very little could be done by any
one state, except, perhaps, to declare the principle for reasons of
clarity. Because jurisdiction is so linked with service of process,
such a declaration should be integrated with the provisions regard-
ing service of process, both in actions in personam and in rem. Thus,
no separate statute would be needed.
For venue purposes, perhaps a corporate treatment is the best. It
should contain disjunctive language as to the alternatives, so as to
be cumulative to general venue provisions. Such a statute might be
as follows:
An action may be commenced against an unincorporated asso-
ciation in any county in which the association does business, or
has an agent, or maintains an office.
The statute would be subject to the general provisions regarding
a change of venue. Such was the reason for the use of the word
"commenced" rather than "maintained" in the first line.
As for service of process, again perhaps an entity treatment is
the best in order to be consistent. Thereby, service upon associa-
tions would follow the same rule as service upon corporations. In
order to simplify the statutes and to provide for flexibility, the fol-
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lowing statute is recommended:
Service of process upon an unincorporated association doing
business in this state may be had upon any agent of the asso-
ciation.
Here it is noted that for the purpose of jurisdiction, the phrase
"doing business" is inserted. While recognizing the danger of its
being interpreted as applying to commercial associations only, still,
it seems that such a phrase would receive the recognized interpreta-
tion and thus the association would be placed in the same category
as a foreign corporation for purposes of jurisdiction. The term
"agent" is also used instead of a particular officer since it may be
that all associations do not have similar officers.
The execution of judgments against unincorporated associations
is again closely related to constitutional law. For that reason, no
attempt is here made to reach the outer limits imposed by the due
process clause of the Constitution. Therefore, it is suggested that
two statutes be used. The first would merely carry out the corporate
theory consistently and provide for execution against joint property.
The second would attempt to define the scope of the subsequent action
against an individual member and to provide for the proper pro-
cedure to be used. Two divisions are made here, the first as regards
non-residents, and the second as regards residents. Such a statute
might be as follows:
Execution of a judgment against an unincorporated association
may be levied against its property, or the joint property of its
members.
Upon the return of execution levied upon the joint property
unsatisfied, individual property of the members may be levied
upon as follows:
(1) If the member is a non-resident, by a new action com-
menced against him by regular process and service of sum-
mons, or seizure of his property by attachment.
(2) If the member is a resident, by a notice served upon
him personally after judgment, apprizing him that at the
stated time and place, a motion will be made to enter judg-
ment against him personally.
At the new and subsequent proceeding, whether it is the new
action under (1) or (2), the prior judgment against the asso-
ciation shall be res judicata as to matters actually litigated there-
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